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HEALTH LAW-PRIVACY IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: A BOTCHED
EXPERIMENT
INTRODUCTION

A few months ago, ALexis's physician diagnosed her with a rare,
incurabLe, hereditary disease. 1 A few days ago, ALexis Lost her job as
a premier teLevision news anchor. The onLy link between the two
events was her participation in a medicaL research experiment. ALexis
assumed her heaLth information wouLd remain confidentiaL, and
never imagined that it wouLd end up in the hands of her empLoyer.
Medical research is booming in the United States. 2 Along with
the boom has come the increased circulation of protected health
information (PHI), sometimes to unauthorized recipients. 3 Hospi
tal-based research requires that a patient's PHI be viewed by hun
dreds of individuals, including physicians, nurses, x-ray technicians,
billing clerks, hospital administrators, insurance companies, re
search sponsors, and other data specialists. 4 Often, a patient or re
search participant has no idea that his or her health information is
being shared so widely.5 Currently, the medical research industry
attempts to protect the privacy of medical research participants by
policing itself, using either Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or
1. Alexis, a hypothetical character, guides this journey through the medical re
search process as it winds through issues including federal regulations, informed con
sent, and the legal process.
2. From 1995 to 2002, "federal funding for research has more than doubled." Eve
E. Slater, IRB Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402, 1402 (2002). Privately sponsored
research has experienced similar growth. Id.; see also Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Mal
practice: Risk and Responsibility in Human Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y
175, 175 (2004) (finding that nearly nineteen million people currently participate in
clinical research trials).
3. "Health information" is information that is created or received and "[r]elates
to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individuaL"
45 c.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). "Protected health information" is health information that
can assist in identifying an individual and is "(i) transmitted by electronic media; (ii)
maintained in electronic media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or
medium." Id.
4. Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction to
the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481,483
(2000) (finding that during a typical hospital stay as many as 400 people may have
access to a patient's medical records).
5. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462, 82,466 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164).
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privacy committees, located within the walls of research
institutions. 6
Failing to inform medical research participants of material PHI
disclosure practices not only violates ethical research principles,7 it
also exposes medical researchers to liability. This Note argues that
those conducting medical research are liable in tort when they fail
to properly protect research participants by informing them of the
privacy risks associated with their participation in the research.
Medical research participants must be adequately informed of com
mon PHI disclosure practices along with the risks of such
disclosures.
Part I develops the profile of a hypothetical research partici
pant, Alexis, introduced above. Part II addresses the role of IRBs,
focusing on the doctrine of informed consent. This Part also dis
cusses authorizations for the release of PHI under the Health Insur
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).8 Part III
discusses the impacts of technology on PHI and the increased use of
business associate agreements in outsourcing both administrative
functions and medical monitoring, illustrating common mistakes
that lead to the disclosure of PHI to unauthorized recipients. Part
IV argues that the medical community's reliance on IRBs, privacy
boards, and the doctrine of informed consent fails to adequately
protect privacy interests and advocates for the extension of a legal
liability standard to protect the privacy interests of research partici
pants. Part V discusses familiar theories of legal liability used to
compensate research participants whose PHI has been mishandled
or disclosed to unauthorized recipients. By way of illustration, this
Part concludes with a brief application of the negligence standard of
liability to provide a remedy for Alexis.

6. "[An] IRB is an administrative body established to protect the rights and wel
fare of human research subjects recruited to participate in research activities conducted
under the auspices of the institution with which it is affiliated." DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (HHS), OFF. OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, PROTECTING
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK (1993)
[hereinafter HHS IRB GUIDEBOOK], available at hup://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/irb/irb_
chapter1.htm.
7. See infra Part II.
8. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.c.).
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THE HYPOTHETICAL

Alexis had been doing very well for herself in the competitive
news anchor market; however, she began to notice subtle changes in
her mood and behavior. As these symptoms persisted, she eventually
contacted her physician, Dr. Brohman,9 who performed a genetic
consultation IO and diagnosed Alexis with Huntington's disease. l l
Huntington's disease is a progressive neurological disorder,
which leads to death approximately fifteen years after onset of symp
toms.I 2 As the disease progresses, those afflicted with Huntington's
will experience involuntary body movements, difficulty making eye
contact, hesitant or slurred speech, and dementia.13 Alexis learned
that her prognosis was grim. There is no known cure for Hunting
ton's disease and no drug therapy is currently available to meaning
fully delay progression of the disease or alleviate its symptoms. 14
When Alexis first learned of her diagnosis, the effects of the dis
ease on her career, family, and reputation were at the forefront of her
thoughts. Alexis's position as a prominent news anchor and commu
nity personality prevented her from disclosing her illness. In fact,
Alexis's employer made the decision to hire her based on her poten
tial for long-term employment. 15 While Alexis struggled to cope with
the news of her illness, she also wondered if there was some way that
she could provide the medical community with valuable information
to advance scientific understanding of her incurable disease.
9. Dr. Brohman is a fictitious person.
10. A genetic consultation provides information and resources for those at risk
for genetic disorders. U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, HANDBOOK: YOUR
GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING GENETIC CONDITIONS 88 (2006), available at http://ghr.
nlm.nih.gov/dynamiclmages/understandGenetics.pdf.
11. Huntington's disease is a "hereditary disease that begins with occasional jerks
or spasms" leading to "gradual loss of brain cells ... and mental deterioration." THE
MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATIQN 553 (2d ed. 2003).
12. J. Stephen Huff, Huntington Chorea, EMEDICINE, Mar. 9,2005, http://www.
emedicine.com/emerg/topic254.htm.
13. MayoClinic.com, Huntington's Disease, http://www.mayoclinic.com!healthl
huntingtons-diseaseIDS00401IDSECfION=2& (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); see also
Huff, supra note 12 (describing further symptoms of Huntington's disease).
14. Medline Plus, Huntington's Disease, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/articie/000770.htm#Treatment (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); Huff, supra note 12.
15. Alexis's employer believes that television viewers are comfortable with famil
iar faces reporting the news. See Patricia Sullivan, ABC News Anchor was a Voice of
the World, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at AI, available at LEXIS (stating that Peter
Jennings was "a familiar face in millions of households for more than 40 years," en
joying top world news "ratings for eleven of the past twenty years").
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Dr. Brohman began researching and identifying available
clinical trials 16 related to Huntington's disease and presented Alexis
with a trial sponsored by GenoPharm Solutions, Inc. (Geno
Pharm),17 a major pharmaceutical and genetic research corpora
tiOn. 18 While reading a consent form that would allow Alexis to
participate in the clinical trial, Alexis noticed that she would not re
ceive financial compensation for her participation; however, she dis
covered that Dr. Brohman would receive $8,000 for enrolling Alexis
in the trial. 19
After learning that she could help others afflicted with Hunting
ton's by participating in a clinical research study, Alexis was eager to
participate. She assumed, like many participants, that her status as a
research participant would remain confidential.
Unfortunately, Alexis's admirable intentions were met with the
mishandling and disclosure of her private health information, a risk
she certainly would have avoided had she been fully informed. As it
happened, a disgruntled data specialist, having access to medical
records of research participants, broadcast Alexis's medical records,
along with the records of hundreds of other research participants, via
16. Clinical trials investigate new drugs, medical devices, treatments, or surgical
processes through prevention trials, diagnostic trials, or screening trials. Among the
most common are those clinical trials focusing on treatments. Cinead R. Kubiak, Con
flicting Interests & Conflicting Laws: Re-Aligning the Purpose and Practice of Research
Ethics Committees, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 759, 770 (2005).
17. GenoPharm is a fictitious corporation.
18. A physician will often suggest a clinical trial focusing on the specific condition
of a patient. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 768. However, prospective participants can also
begin their own investigation into available clinical trials by searching the Internet.
Most Internet searches that seek information on clinical trials lead to the National Insti
tutes of Health (NIH) clinical trials website containing a comprehensive list of available
clinical trials, which may be sorted by condition, symptom, disease, sponsor, and loca
tion. See generally ClinicaITrials.gov, Information on Clinical Trials and Human Re
search Studies, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
19. Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 68
(2004). In the institutional setting, payments to physicians and researchers enrolling
patients into clinical trials range from $2,000 to $5,000. Id. In private practice, "phar
maceutical companies may pay $7,000 to $8,000 per patient enrolled in a standard, in
tensive 48-week protocol." /d. Dr. Brohman may justify a portion of this amount as
financial compensation for Bay General Hospital and for his own research group's time
and effort involved in tracking Alexis's progress through the course of the study. See
id. However, Alexis did not know that Dr. Brohman and the hospital received a signifi
cant portion of that amount purely as an incentive to enroll patients in the clinical trial.
Id. (commenting that typical contracts with pharmaceutical companies usually provide
payments for overhead costs associated with the clinical trial as well as supplying a
significant portion for profit).
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e-mail, to several news networks. 20 The data, which included infor
mation about Alexis's participation in the research experiment,
quickly became available to her co-workers, her colleagues at com
peting networks, and her own network managers. Afterwards, Alexis
lost her job and her group health insurance, and suffered irreparable
damage to her reputation. Dismayed, Alexis must now consider her
options.

II.

PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEDICAL RESEARCH

COMMUNITY: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS

&

THE HEALTH

INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

The opportunity for physicians to conduct medical research in
volving human subjects is a "privilege and not a right."21 Modern
ethical principles have developed over time and researchers must
now adhere to these principles while conducting clinical trials. 22
The Nuremberg Code, resulting from the trials of war criminals
charged with performing research on involuntary human subjects in
Nazi Germany, provides that "voluntary consent of the human sub
ject is absolutely essential. ... [A] person ... should be so situated
as to be able to exercise free power of choice."23 The Belmont Re
port,24 written in 1979 by the National Commission for the Protec
20. The disgruntled employee had just received a poor performance evaluation.
Armed with access to vast amounts of sensitive health information on thousands of
patients and with access to an e-mail program, this employee had sufficient resources
and motivation to wreak havoc on the employer, and as a result, Alexis. See Amy M.
Jurevic, When Technology and Health Care Collide: Issues with Electronic Medical
Records and Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. REV. 809, 832 (1998) (commenting that e
mail communications allow instantaneous communication to be broadcast to the
world); see also id. at 809 (citing Doug Stanley & Craig Palosky, Medical Records Not
So Secure, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 18, 1997, at 1) (noting that the identities of 4,000 patients
with AIDS were sent to two news organizations).
21. Steven Peckman, A Shared Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects, in
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCfION 16, 17 (Robert J.
Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2d ed. 2006).
22. A comprehensive review of the ethical underpinnings of human subject re
search is beyond the scope of this Note. For a well-developed article on the ethical
underpinnings of research, see Kubiak, supra note 16, at 771-85 (providing analysis of
the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, and the inter
national ethical guidelines established by the Council for International Organizations of
Medical Science in conjunction with the World Health Organization).
23. THE NUREMBERG CODE, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM·
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949),
reprinted in NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REGULATION AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES,
available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html.
24. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECfION OF HUMAN SUBJECfS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
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tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
provides ethical guidelines for researchers at all federally funded
institutions. 25 The Belmont Report requires respect for an individ
ual's autonomy-the right to make a choice free from obstruction. 26
In addition, the Belmont Report recognizes the need to balance the
benefit to society that this research can provide against the risks to
individual research participants. 27
Currently, the medical research community relies on the super
visory role of IRBs and the doctrine of informed consent to protect
research participants from the risks and potential abuses of medical
research. 28 In addition, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac
countability Act (HIPAA)29 and its complementary Privacy Rule
protect the private health information of health care consumers, in
cluding research participants. 3o
A.

Institutional Review Boards

The National Research Act of 1974 created Institutional Re
view Boards (IRBs) in response to concerns about research abuses
at medical schools and hospitals. 31 IRBs conduct reviews of proGUIDELINES FOR THE PROTEcrION OF HUMAN SUBJEcrS OF RESEARCH (1979) [herein
after BELMONT REPORT], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/
guidancelbelmont.htm.
25. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 777.
26. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 24, at Part B(l).
27. Id. at Part B. An experiment designed to benefit society at large may cause
measurable harm to the individual research participants. To address these situations,
the Belmont Report expresses that the protection of beneficence extends not only to
the overall research enterprise but also to individual research participants. Id. at Part
B(2). Beneficence can be stated as complements: "(1) do not harm and (2) maximize
possible benefits." Id. Beneficence is stated easily enough; however, actual practice
demonstrates that beneficence is sometimes difficult.
28. Abuses in human subject research are not new. See generally JAMES H.
JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993) (explaining that fed
erally funded researchers informed African-American men that they would be treated
for their condition; however, researchers clearly intended to withhold treatment to
study the extended effects of syphilis); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ASSISTANT SEC'y FOR
THE ENV'T, SAFETY, & HEALTH, HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS: THE DEPART
MENT OF ENERGY ROADMAP TO THE STORY AND RECORDS (1995), available at http://
www.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/roadmap/index.html(describing de-classified informa
tion that reveals that many research participants did not consent to federally funded
research on the effects of radiation exposure).
29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.c.).
30. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2005).
31. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 474, 88 Stat. 343 (codi
fied as amended in scattered sections of 5, 39, and 42 U.S.c.).
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posed research protocols 32 and must review and approve all human
subject research conducted within a research institution. 33 Since
the adoption of federal legislation related to human subject protec
tions, each federally funded institution that chooses to conduct
human-subject research must maintain an IRB and create an envi
ronment that "supports the highest ethical standards" for the pro
tection of human subjects. 34 In fact, the IRB is the only entity "in
the research process that exist[s] solely to protect human
subjects."35
IRBs are regulated by both the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administra
tion (FDA).36 HHS regulations, often termed the Common Rule,
apply to federally funded human subject research,37 whereas FDA
regulations apply to research studying drugs, devices, and other
products regulated by the FDA, regardless of federal funding sta
tuS. 38 With respect to IRB functions, the Common Rule and the
FDA regulations are parallel,39

32. Protocol is defined as "[a] precise and detailed plan for the study of a bio
medical problem or for a regimen of therapy." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1466
(27th ed. 2000).
33. HHS IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 6, at 5-7; see also Peckman, supra note 21,
at 17.
34. Peckman, supra note 21, at 17.
35. Mark R. Yessian, Reflections from the Office of the Inspector General, in IN
STITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 9, 10.
To be effective in their task of protecting human subjects, IRBs must function indepen
dently of the pressures of the research institution and retain the "ultimate authority for
the approval of research with human subjects," which is not always the case. Peckman,
supra note 21, at 19.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005) (HHS: Informed Consent and IRBs); 21 c.F.R. § 50
(2006) (FDA: Informed Consent); 21 c.F.R. § 56 (2006) (FDA: IRBs).
37. 42 U.S.c. § 289(a) (2000) (IRB approval required for all research utilizing
federal funds).
38. See generally Appendix B: Significant Differences in FDA and HHS Regula
tions for the Protection of Human Subjects, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MAN
AGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 515.
39. For example, each IRB consists of at least five individuals with at least one
member who has a primary interest in science and at least one member who has a
primary interest in a non-scientific area. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107. It is
worth noting that the "non-scientific" position is not defined and may be filled by a
member of the hospital administration (risk management, quality assurance, or compli
ance) or perhaps an attorney not affiliated directly with the hospital. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107. An IRB may also invite individuals with specialized train
ing, knowledge, or expertise to assist with reviews that require additional perspective.
45 C.F.R. § 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107.
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Informed Consent

Essentially, an IRB reviews research protocols40 and ensures
that informed consent documents provide research participants
with material information. 41 Informed consent, in the context of
medical research, requires that research participants receive a
"description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to
the subject."42 An informed decision cannot be made unless infor
mation regarding the "purpose, methods, risks, benefits, and alter
natives to the [proposed] research" is disclosed. 43 The Common
Rule and FDA regulations addressing informed consent require
that "such consent [be obtained] only under circumstances that pro
vide the prospective subject ... sufficient opportunity to consider
whether or not to participate and that ... the possibility of coercion
or undue influence [be minimized]. "44 Informed consent, operating
effectively, ensures that individuals make an informed decision, al
lowing the individual to determine whether they will participate in a
clinical trial.
Modern practice requires uniformity in research trials. Study
sponsors, such as pharmaceutical corporations or device manufac
turers, submit protocols and informed consent forms directly to the
IRB without significant preparation or revision by the medical re
searchers or physicians who actually conduct and supervise the tri
als. 45 After all, most medical research is conducted at multiple
research sites,46 and studies must be conducted uniformly to pro
mote efficiency and reliability of research data.47 However, the
presence of multi-site research does not excuse an IRB from its pri
mary responsibility of ensuring that research participants are fully
informed of all material risks.48
40. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.108-.111; 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.108-.111.
41, 45 c.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20.
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
43. Ezekiel l. Emanuel et aI., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 lAMA
2701, 2706 (2000).
44. 21 c.F.R. § 50.20.
45. Sanford Chodosh, A Unified Human-Research Protection Program, in INSTI
TUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNcnON, supra note 21, at 13, 14.
46. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 788. Research centers consist of "hospitals, aca
demic centers, managed care organizations, federal and state government agencies, and
corporations, including pharmaceutical and device manufacturers." [d.
47. Chodosh, supra note 45, at 15.
48. ld.
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act49

When research requires the collection of medical data, "federal
regulations unquestionably require that ... IRB[s] approve the con
ditions for access to ... medical record[s] and the procedures for
protecting confidentiality."50 Title II of HIPAA focuses on protect
ing the health information that health care institutions obtain and
store. The administrative simplification provisions in Title II re
quire HHS to establish national standards for electronic health care
transactions. 51 The regulations associated with HIPAA that protect
personally identifiable PHJ52 are commonly referred to as the Pri
vacy Rule.
The Privacy Rule encompasses more than just the require
ments of the Common Rule and FDA regulations; however, in
medical research, where both the Privacy Rule and the Common
Rule or FDA regulations apply, the stricter requirements of each
must be followed. 53 The Privacy Rule requires that research par
ticipants authorize, in writing, the disclosure of their PHJ.54 Medi
cal researchers, however, often resent implementing provisions of
HIPAA and its associated regulations. 55
Written authorization is most commonly sought using a Patient
Authorization Form, also referred to as a Privacy Rule Authoriza
49. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.c.).
50. Robert J. Amdur, The Limits of Institutional Review Board Authority, in IN
STITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 21, at 30, 31.
51. See HHS, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Overview, http://www.cms.
hhs.govlHIPAAGenInfo (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
52. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) (defining individually identifiable health informa
tion as "any information, including demographic information collected from an individ
ual, that ... is created or received by a health care provider ... [and] identifies the
individual; or ... with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify the individual").
53. Ellen Holt, The HIPAA Privacy Rule, Research, and IRBs, ApPLIED
CLINICAL TRIALS, June 2003, at 48, 50; available at http://www.actmagazine.com/applied
c1inicaltrials/data/articlestandard/appliedclinicaltrialsl222003/58533/article.pdf.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 ("Disclosure means the release, transfer, provision of, ac
cess to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the
information."); 45 c.F.R. § 164.508 (requiring written authorization as a general rule).
But see 45 c.F.R. § 164.512 (stating that authorization is not required when use and
disclosure is required by law, public health, abuse or domestic violence, health over
sight, judicial or administrative proceedings, law enforcement, crimes on premises, and
emergencies).
55. Mary Durham, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from Within the
Healthcare Delivery System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 492 (2002).

544

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:535

tion.56 However, authorization is distinct from informed consent.
Informed consent seeks an "individual's [permission] to participate
in the research [itself,]" whereas an authorization represents an in
dividual's permission to use or disclose PHI for research or medical
purposes.57 As discussed earlier, an informed consent form de
scribes the research study and its anticipated risks and benefits.58
Not insignificant to the informed consent requirements, however, is
the duty to describe the methods used to protect the privacy of
records. 59
Although the Privacy Rule requires that authorizations contain
specific core elements,60 it does not require that an authorization be
separate from informed consent. 61 An authorization, therefore,
may be combined with an informed consent document. 62 If an in
formed consent document is combined with an authorization to dis
close PHI, the Common Rule and FDA regulations "require IRB
review of the combined document. "63 Thus, the IRB has the dual
role of reviewing not only the research protocol contained in the
informed consent, but also the authorization. 64 The Privacy Rule
and IRBs both afford protection to research participants; however,
an understanding of current practices in medical research is neces
sary to determine whether these protections are sufficient.
56. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH PUBL'N. No. 04-5529, HIPAA AUTHORIZA·
TION FOR RESEARCH 1 (2004) [hereinafter HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH],
available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/authorization.pdf (listing core el
ements of research authorization and sample authorizations).
57. Id. at 1, 2-4.
58. Id. ; see supra Part n.B.
59. See HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56.
60. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2005) (stating that an authorization form must contain,
among other items, identification of the PHI to be used or disclosed, identification of
the persons authorized to make the use or disclosure, identification of the authorized
recipients of the PHI, a description of each purpose for use or disclosure, an expiration
date, and a statement related to the potential that the PHI is subject to re-disclosure by
the recipient).
61. Id.
62. HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56, at 1.
63. Id.
64. Even if the informed consent and authorization remain separate, "[i]t is likely
that IRBs will be primarily involved in acting on requests for waiver or alteration of the
Authorization requirement." NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH PUBL'N No. 03-5428, INSTI
TUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2003), available at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/IRB_Factsheet.pdf. Since the authorization
form must comply with core requirements, the eventual review of authorizations by
independent review boards, such as an IRB or privacy board, is quite foreseeable. Holt,
supra note 53, at 48.
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CURRENT PRACTICES IN MEDICAL RESEARCH INCREASE
DISCLOSURE OF PHI

Technology is prevalent in the practice of medicine65 and
healthcare institutions continue to aggressively pursue technologi
cal advancements in order to increase efficiency, facilitate world
wide communication, and reduce costS.66 With the increasing need
and ability to pass information quickly between agencies and heath
care entities, medical research requires increased privacy
protection. 67
A.

Technology in Medical Research

The most common operations using the protected health infor
mation of research participants are labeled "backroom," or admin-
istrative, operations and include billing, insurance claims
processing, and transcription. 68 Medical billing and transcription
involve relatively simple technologies, such as the Internet and cus
tomized word processing and spreadsheet software. 69 Transcription
of medical reports is big business, generating revenues in excess of
$15 billion per year. 70 However, the use of more sophisticated tech
nology by medical researchers for non-administrative purposes,
such as remote monitoring of a patient's vital statistics, is now also
prevalent.
Disease management is the most rapidly growing sector in
health care and includes active monitoring of patient progress and
coordination of care between multiple researchers.?1 Newer tech
nology enables a physician or researcher to remotely monitor
health information, such as a patient's heart rate.?2 Advanced tech
nologies, such as mobile-to-mobile or machine-to-machine (M2M)
65. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope,
Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANN_ HEALTH L. 205, 234-35 (2005) (describ
ing mobile to mobile technology in patient monitoring and health care instructions).
66. Barbara Williams, Virtual Web Wave of the Future: Integration of Healthcare
Systems on the Internet, 76 N.D. L. REV. 365, 365 (2000).
67. June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Commercial Use of Protected Health Information
Under HIPAA's Privacy Rule: Reasonable Disclosure or Disguised Marketing?, 82 NEB.
L. REV. 741, 743 (2004).
68. McLean, supra note 65, at 229.
69. Id. at 231.
70. Id. at 230. Most aspects of medicine and research require the documentation
of altered medical conditions, adjusted treatment orders, and billing adjustments based
on those changes. Id.
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id. at 234-35.
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devices, are becoming essential in monitoring medical conditions. 73
Also essential is the ability to perform administrative functions effi
ciently at low cost.

B.

Business Associates

Although unknown to most research participants, it is common
practice in the medical research community to use what are known
as "business associates" to perform certain administrative opera
tions in an effort to reduce costs or to streamline administrative
processes.74 A "business associate" is defined as a business or indi
vidual that contracts to perform administrative functions or services
that require the disclosure of PHU 5 HIPAA requires that the
health care or research institution enter into an agreement with the
business associate to safeguard identifiable health information used
by or disclosed to the business associate. 76 Under a business associ
ate contract, a business associate steps into the shoes of the health
care institution and is, therefore, not permitted to use or disclose
health information in any way that would violate the Privacy
Rule. 77
Further cost savings in medical research are realized by using
offshore business associates. Because of the economic incentives
associated with "offshoring," an increasing number of administra
73. [d. Wireless communication devices, such as snap-on mobile phone accesso
ries, are able to monitor heart rates and provide that information, by way of a radio
transmitter, to a remote location where a medical researcher can analyze the data in
real time using another mobile device, such as a personal digital assistant. See SONY
ERICSSON, M2M: EXPANDING WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES 10 (2005), available at http://
www.sonyericsson.com!spg.jsp?cc=us&1c=en&ver=4002&template=phl&zone=ph (fol
low "M2M Brochure" link); see also Sony Ericsson, Facilitate Remote Care for
Patients, http://www.sonyericsson.com/spg.jsp?cc=us&1c=es&ver=4002&template=pal_
5&zone=pa&prid=13&rid=15&lm=pal&cid=140 (describing health care applications
for M2M technology) (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
74. HHS OFF. OF CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3
(2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE], available at http://www.
hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf.
75. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). A business associate may be located in the same
town or in an international location, so long as the associate is not considered a member
of the related health care entity. Id.
76. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e).
77. SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 74, at 3. HHS pro
vides sample business associate agreements to assist health care entities. HHS Off. of
Civil Rights, Sample Business Associate Contract Provisions, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
hipaa/contractprov.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). HIPAA requires that health care
institutions, and their business associates, maintain reasonable and appropriate safe
guards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of personal health information.
Jurevic, supra note 20, at 815.
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tive operations are being sent abroad for completion.7 8 With the
increase in medical monitoring comes an expanded reliance on out
sourcing, resulting from the need to coordinate medical personnel,
data, data analysis, and feedback.7 9 In turn, an increased reliance
on outsourcing expands the likelihood that a research participant's
PHI will be disseminated to unauthorized recipients. 8o
C.

Mishandled Health Information: The Risk of Using Business
Associates

The very nature of electronic medical records increases the risk
that PHI will be mishandled or disclosed to an unauthorized recipi
ent. 81 Electronic records combine data stored in multiple computer
systems; thus, large amounts of data can be accessed from a single
location. 82 Medical records contain a wealth of personal informa
tion, including an individual's family history, genetic test results,
history of any prior drug use, and treatment of any sexually trans
mitted diseases. 83 Unfortunately, electronic storage of health
records allows cross-referencing of medical data in ways not origi
nally intended, permitting easy and inexpensive searching, data
mining, and distribution of PHI.84 Yet, despite the availability of
information and the ease of filtering and sorting information, more

78. McLean, supra note 65, at 212-13. Offshoring is beneficial where a favorable
wage-benefit differential exists, where cost effective telecommunications are present,
and where numbers of educated, English-speaking individuals are concentrated in other
countries. Id. at 212-15. Using these factors to identify favorable areas of the world to
satisfy the needs of the medical research community, China, Russia, and India are
"merging rapidly into the global labor market" for outsourcing. Id. at 215.
79. Id. at 233-37.
80. Barbara Von Tigerstrom, Protection of Health Information Privacy: The Chal
lenges and Possibilities of Technology, 4 ApPEAL 44,46 (1998) (finding the number of
uses of medical information to mean that the "widespread dissemination of personal
information is inevitable, and this makes it difficult to control the use of such
information").
81. Jurevic, supra note 20, at 812.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 808.
84. Id. at 812. For example, a banker who obtains access to state health records
improperly secured (and therefore mishandled) may cross-reference a list of patients
known to have cancer with the bank's loan register so that the loans of patients with
cancer may be called in for immediate payment. Id. at 809 (citing E. Bartlett, RMS
Need to Safeguard Computerized Patient Records to Protect Hospitals, 15 Hosp. RISK
MUMT. 129, 132 (1993».
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established threats continue to expose medical information to unau
thorized and unintended recipients. 85
The most common threat to health information privacy contin
ues to be sabotage by disgruntled employees, including destruction
of hardware and software, purposeful entering of incorrect data, de
letion or alteration of data, or the planting of "logic bombs"-pro
grams that destroy data or computer applications. 86 Human error,
such as the loss of laptop computers used by healthcare workers
and medical researchers, also leads to the disclosure of PHI.87 Per
haps the most obvious, and egregious, example of disclosure of PHI
to unauthorized sources is the selling of data contained in large
databases. 88 In addition, researchers can encounter scenarios in
which an offshore business associate threatens to post PHI on the
Internet (a clear violation of HIPAA) in order to force resolution of
a contract dispute. 89
Revisiting Alexis
Dr. Brohman chose to use a mobile device to monitor Alexis's
symptoms during the course of the clinical trial because GenoPharm
desired to develop a drug remedy targeting specific symptoms of
Huntington's disease. The hospital hosting Dr. Brohman's clinical
85. Id. at 809 (citing E. Bartlett, RMS Need to Safeguard Computerized Patient
Records to Protect Hospitals, 15 Hosp. RISK MGMT. 129, 129-40 (1993» (providing mul
tiple examples of breaches of privacy with respect to medical records).
86. Id. at 809-12. Additional threats include physical problems with technology,
such as outdated or fragile equipment, or physical theft by employees. Id. at 812.
Hackers, who gain access to computer systems and browse for valuable information,
may also gain access to PHI. Id. Trojan horses, programs that appear to perform a
valid function but operate underneath to uncover confidential information such as net
work passwords or access paths to restricted data, can also be planted by hackers or
disgruntled employees, without a noticeable impact on system performance. Id.
87. Carol Ann Quinsey, Information Security-An Overview, AM. HEALTH MED.
INFO. MGMT. ASS'N, Aug. 2003, available at http://library.ahima.orglxpedio/groups/
public/documents/ahima/bok1_021875.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_021875 (replacing Mary
D. Brandt, Information Security-An Overview, AM. HEALTH MED. INFO. MGMT.
ASS'N, June 1996).
88. Bob Sullivan, Choice Point to Pay $15 Million over Data Breach,
MSNBC.cOM, Jan. 26, 2006, available at LEXIS. ChoicePoint, Inc., a data warehouser,
settled charges for failing to protect consumers' confidential personal information. Id.
ChoicePoint sold information on 163,000 individual consumers and settled with the Fed
eral Trade Commission to pay a $10 million fine. Id. In addition, ChoicePoint will
spend $5 million to establish a fund to aid victims. Id. To date, this is the largest pen
alty imposed for failing to properly secure data. Id.
89. McLean, supra note 65, at 232 (finding that this scenario experienced by the
University of California at San Francisco was not an isolated event, leading six states to
contemplate banning outsourcing to avoid such situations).
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trial entered into a business associate contract with an offshore com
pany to provide administrative and patient monitoring services. 90
Alexis believed her medical information would remain in the hospi
tal. She was unaware that her PHI would be outsourced to business
associates. Because privacy of her medical condition was important
to her, Alexis would not have participated in the clinical trial, had she
been adequately informed.
IV.

WHEN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY FAILS TO ADEQUATELY

INFORM RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, A LEGAL STANDARD OF
LIABILITY MUST BE ApPLIED

After examining privacy interests in personal health informa
tion, this Part analyzes the current protections provided by the
medical research community. This Part also argues that the protec
tions provided by the medical research community, such as in
formed consent or IRB oversight of medical research, are
insufficient. Therefore, applying legal standards of liability is neces
sary to protect research participants.
A.

Privacy Rights in Medical Records

The Supreme Court addressed privacy in integrated medical
systems in Whalen v. Roe.91 In Whalen, a state statute permitted
the state to track the distribution of certain drugs by obtaining cop
ies of prescriptions that contained personal information of those pa
tients receiving them.92 In this case, the personal information was
kept secure on an off-line computer that was locked in a room sur
rounded by a wire fence and monitored by an alarm system. 93 The
Supreme Court recognized the various safeguards used to control
access to personal information94 and concluded that, in this case, no
90. See, e.g., PORTECK, SOLUTIONS FOR PROVIDERS 2, available at http://www.
compumedbilling.com/brochures/Providers_Brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007)
(listing available services, including assisting clients with "process improvements, tech
nology automation and offshore implementation"); Porteck, Contact Us, http://www.
porteck.com/contactus.htm (last visited Feb. 18,2007) (listing offices both in the United
States and India); see also MedValue Offshore Solutions, Inc., Medical Claims Process
ing-Claim Indexing-HCFA Data Entry, http://medvaluebpo.com (last visited Feb. 18,
2007) (advertising processing and processing support services, including "HIPAA
Compliance").
91. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
92. Id. at 592-94.
93. Id. at 594.
94. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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privacy interests were significantly infringed by the state statute. 95
However, the Court recognized a "threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in [massive]
computerized . . . files. "96 The Court made clear that it was not
required to decide the privacy issues arising specifically from un
warranted disclosures of private health information, whether inten
tional or unintentiona1. 97 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
recognized that an individual's interest in preventing disclosure of
personal information is a privacy right, even though it was not seri
ously invaded in the specific factual circumstances presented in
Whalen. 98 Justice Brennan could not say, however, that different
factual circumstances would not demonstrate a need for restrictions
on the collection and disclosure of personal health information. 99
Rather, he recognized that the "central storage and easy accessibil
ity of computerized data vastly increases the potential for abuse. "100
As discussed above, significant technological advancements,
enabling the efficient and widespread dissemination of medical
records, have occurred since the Court decided Whalen in 1977.1 01
Therefore, it is unlikely that Whalen will shield the unauthorized
disclosure of PHI from being considered a violation of privacy. In
fact, Justice Brennan stated that broad dissemination would
"clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights."102 Ul
timately, Whalen left open the issue of the impacts of expanded
technology on broad circulation of PHI.
In addition, the Privacy Rule 103 provides that individuals have
the "right to adequate notice of the uses and disclosures" of their
PHJ.104 The description of the disclosure of PHI must include suffi
cient detail so that a research participant is aware of both required
95. Id. at 597 (majority opinion) (finding that states are given "broad latitude in
experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital concern," such as misuse of
dangerous drugs).
96. Id. at 605.
97. Id. at 605-06.
98. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. /d. at 607.
100. Id.
101. See supra Part III.A.
102. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2005).
104. Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and Disclosure of Protected Health Information
for Research Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Unrealized Patient Autonomy and Bur
densome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV. 447, 474 (2003) (quoting 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.520(a)(1».
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and permitted disclosures. lOS The requirement to inform an indi
vidual of the disclosures of PHI further supports the notion of a
right to privacy in personal health information.106
Further evidence of this right can be found both in the require
ments of HIPAA and the doctrine of informed consent. After all,
HIPAA establishes an authorization requirement to inform re
search participants of their privacy rights as well as the risks associ
ated with the use and disclosure of PHI.107 Informed consent only
requires that individuals understand the potential risks of participa
tion in the research protocol. 108 As previously discussed, authoriza
tion focuses on "making patients clearly understand how their
information will be used for research activities, [and] the risk that
[this] information could be re-disclosed by researchers and other
recipients."109

B.

Authorization Forms Fail to Adequately Inform Research
Participants of PHI Disclosure Risks

If privacy notices describing the general use and disclosure of a
research participant's PHI are too lengthy, or if the sections con
taining research-specific disclosures are too abbreviated, an individ
ual is unlikely to know whether his or her PHI will be used or
disclosed while participating in the clinical tria1. 110 The Privacy
Rule requires that research authorizations contain certain elements
and statements.1 11 For example, the name or identity of those who
are authorized to use a research participant's PHI must be dis
closed. 1l 2 Researchers must also identify potential risks associated
with disclosures of PHI to individuals or entities outside the re
search institution, because those subsequent disclosures may no
longer be protected by the Privacy Rule. 113 Alarmingly, a general
statement to the effect that PHI may no longer be protected once
disclosed by a health care institution or research program is suffi
105. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(D).
106. In addition, the term "Privacy Rule" may, by its name, stress the recognition
and importance of a privacy right and conclude that its provisions are aimed to protect
a patient's, or research participant's, privacy interest in identifiable health information.
107. See supra Part II.C. (explaining requirements of authorization under
HIPAA).
lOS. See supra Part ILB. (describing the doctrine of informed consent).
109. Tovino, supra note 104, at 474.
110. Id. at 476.
111. 45 C.F.R. § 164.50S(c) (2005).
112. Id. § 164.50S(c)(1)(ii).
113. [d. § 164.50S(c)(2)(iii).
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cient to satisfy the Privacy Rule's requirement to warn of the re
disclosure risk.1 l4 HIPAA does not require researchers to explain
to patients or research participants the associated risks of re-disclo
sure or to identify those who may actually receive re-disclosed PHI.
Examining a sample authorization form provided by HHS
raises serious doubt as to whether a prospective research partici
pant can accurately gauge the risks of PHI disclosure when viewed
in light of actual practices in the medical research environment. 115
The following language has been deemed acceptable by HHS:
"Those persons who receive your health information may not be
required by Federal privacy laws (such as the Privacy Rule) to pro
tect it and may share your information with others without your
permission."116 The language eviscerates the entire concept of pri
vacy to the extent that the text appears to articulate privacy rights,
only to take them away.
Further confusion arises because some individual research in
stitutions use separate authorization forms while others combine
the authorization with an informed consent form.117 In either
event, authorization forms, or portions of consent forms seeking au
thorization, "fumble when attempting to convey [potential loss of
privacy caused by subsequent disclosures] ... and the patient read
ing the form may fail to understand that the recipient of her infor
mation is not required by the Privacy Rule to protect her
information. "118
General language, such as "reasons we might use or share your
health information are: [t]o do the research described above [and]
... [f]or treatment, payment, or health care operations," does not
accurately inform a prospective research participant of actual dis
114. Tovino, supra note 104, at 466 (commenting that HIPAA merely requires
that the authorization form contain re-disclosure language).
115. HIPAA AUTHORIZATION FOR RESEARCH, supra note 56, at 2.
116. Id. However, case law is absent to determine whether reliance on HHS form
language shields entities from liability stemming from re-disclosure of PHI. See PART·
NERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, GENERAL CONSENT FORM TEMPLATE 8-9 (2005), avail
able at http://healthcare.partners.org/phsirb/consfrm.htm (follow the "General Consent
Form Template" hyperlink) ("Some people or groups who get your health information
might not have to follow the same privacy rules that we follow. We share your health
information only when we must, and we ask anyone who receives it from us to protect
your privacy. However, once your information is shared outside of Partners, we cannot
promise that it will remain private.").
117. Clinical research programs at Massachusetts General Hospital, for example,
use a single consent and authorization form. E.g., PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
supra note 116.
118. Tovino, supra note 104, at 467.
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closure practices, especially those involving business associates in
offshore locations.1l9 Authorization and consent forms that use ter
minology such as "research purposes" to encompass actual prac
tices of disclosing PHI neither inform nor warn a prospective
research participant about known risks of mishandled PHI inherent
in medical research. When medical researchers fail to adequately
inform participants of risks, a negligently injured plaintiff com
monly looks to the doctrine of informed consent to establish that
researchers owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
C.

Informed Consent in the Research Community

In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the Su
preme Court of California expanded the doctrine of informed con
sent when it held that "a physician has a ... duty to disclose all
information [that is] material to the patient's decision," and all in
formation "that may affect the physician's professional judg
ment."120 In Moore, the patient-subject was instructed to return to
the hospital to provide additional tissue samples. 121 The plaintiff
complied, believing that such samples were necessary in the ordi
nary course of his leukemia treatment. 122 The plaintiff had no rea
son to believe that the additional tissue would be used solely to
benefit researchers in making a profit.1 23
By requiring informed consent in instances that might affect a
researcher's professional judgment, Moore demonstrates an appar
ent willingness to expand informed consent beyond the physical
risks associated with the trial to include harms to dignity and eco
nomic interests. Failure to disclose such interests might expose
those involved in medical research to either a lack of consent claim,
or allegations of breach of the physician's fiduciary duty to inform
the patient-subject of material risks inherent in the research experi
ment. 124 Arguably, a physician's professional judgment may not af
fect the risk of a research participant's PHI being mishandled.
119. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 116, at 9-10 (explaining that
those people outside of the institution who may access PHI are "[p]eople or groups that
we hire to do certain work for US, such as data storage companies, our insurers, or our
lawyers[;] [fjederal and state agencies ... [t]he sponsor(s) of the research study, and
people or groups it hires to help perform this research study").
120. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (empha
sis added).
121. Id. at 481.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 483.
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Nonetheless, a non-physical risk can still be material to a patient's
decision to participate in research and should therefore be
disclosed.
D.

Establishing a Legal Basis to Protect Research Participants

In addition to the Moore decision, several other courts have
addressed privacy rights in the context of medical research. 125
These cases demonstrate that a legal standard of liability is needed
to supplement the medical research community's continued reli
ance on informed consent and IRB oversight. In Greenberg v. Chil
dren's Hospital Research Institute, researchers obtained patents for
genes studied in the research of Canavan's Disease, a relatively
rare, but fatal, inherited brain disorder.1 26 Parents allowed tissue
and autopsy samples to be taken from their children who were af
flicted with the disorder; however, the parents did not know that
the researchers intended to commercialize their research results. 127
The court held that researchers have no duty to disclose financial or
commercial conflicts of interest and that no fiduciary duty exists
between "researchers" and "research participants."128 The court
reasoned that the researchers were merely recipients of tissue dona
tions, classifying the research participants as "donors" who lacked a
special relationship to the researchers. 129 The court further rea
soned that since the parents did not enjoy a special relationship
with researchers, no fiduciary duty existed between the researchers
and the families. 130
Greenberg is distinguishable from many medical research situ
ations. The situation in Greenberg is best described as a "research
collaboration gone sour" and does not reflect the typical research
relationship.13 1 The parents in Greenberg provided financial sup
port and assisted researchers in identifying similarly situated fami
lies and recruiting them to the research trial. 132 These parents
contributed efforts toward the research itself; so, in the court's eyes,
the parent-plaintiffs were more appropriately classified as research
125. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 (Md.
2001); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
126. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
127. Id. at 1068.
128. Id. at 1070-72.
129. Id. at 1070-71.
130. Id. at 1070.
131. Id. at 1066.
132. Id. at 1067.
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collaborators. 133 Based on this classification, the court suggested
that the parents could have protected their interests in preventing
the commercialization of research findings,134 The Greenberg deci
sion appears to excuse the exploitation of research participants who
have donated themselves, their tissues, or their financial resources
for the advancement of science. D5 The case would create a danger
ous precedent if its holding were to extend to all medical research
situations.
In contrast, a research participant who is continually moni
tored using disease management technology or who is in an ongoing
relationship with researchers must be treated differently. Unlike
the Greenberg and Moore participants, continually monitored par
ticipants make an ongoing contribution to the clinical trial, and so
they cannot be aptly described as mere tissue donors. Further
more, unlike the parents in Greenberg, these participants are di
rectly affected research participants and are not accurately
classified as research collaborators since they do not assist in
recruiting participants or contribute financial resources. Most re
search participants, like continually monitored participants, are pre
sumably not in a position to protect their financial or
commercialization interests from the competing interests of medical
research sponsors.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 136 has also addressed in
formed consent in research. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute
involved a Johns Hopkins University research program that mea
sured the effects of various lead abatement strategies in certain
classes of dated homes undergoing partial lead modifications,137
The effectiveness of the lead abatement was measured by analyzing
lead levels in the bloodstream of otherwise healthy children over
the course of two years. D8 Landlords received public funding, in
the form of grants or loans, and were encouraged to rent their
dwellings to families with young children,139 The consent agree
133. Id. at 1072-73.
134. Kevin c.J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent
and the Protection of Tissue Sources' Research Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 366 (2004).
135. See Christopher Jackson, Learning From the Mistakes of the Past: Disclosure
of Financial Conflicts of Interest and Genetic Research, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, 24
(2004).
136. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is the highest court in the State. See
Court of Appeals of Maryland, http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals.
137. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 (Md. 2001).
138. Id. at 812.
139. Id.
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ment used by researchers did not explain that the research was de
signed to measure lead abatement or that the "researchers intended
that the children be the canaries in the mines."14o
Apparently, the IRB at Johns Hopkins University found noth
ing wrong with the proposed research protocol or the fact that re
search participants were not informed of the risks involved. 141 In
fact, despite the requirement that an IRB ensure the safety of
human research participants, the IRB at Johns Hopkins University
assisted researchers in circumventing safety requirements. 142
Grimes illustrates that IRBs may not offer adequate protection
the IRB was able, but apparently unwilling, to protect research par
ticipants. Rather, it looked beyond the interests of research partici
pants to assist researchers.
The IRB at the University of Pennsylvania has also been the
target of criticism for its faulty protection of participants in a ge
netic research experiment.1 43 In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger participated
in a genetic research experiment studying the effects of a liver dis
ease treatment. 144 Although Gelsinger's physicians were success
fully managing his condition, he consented, at the age of eighteen,
to participate in a gene therapy experiment, allegedly without being
properly informed of its risks, which resulted in a fatal immune sys
tem reaction. 145 Gelsinger did not expect the research to produce a
direct benefit; after all, his disease was under control.1 46 Even
though the Gelsinger matter eventually settled out of court, the im
pact on the medical research community has been staggering. 147 In
formed consent had yielded to the pressures of research, not in an
obscure research institution or foreign country lacking protections
140. Id. at 813. Historically, canaries were used to determine whether dangerous
levels of toxic gases existed in mines because canaries are particularly susceptible to
certain toxic gases. [d.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 813-14.
143. Complaint-Civil Action at 'lI9l 86-93, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa.,
No. 000901885 (Ct. Com. PI., Philadelphia County, Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://
www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html; see also Paul Gelsinger, Forward to INSTITU·
TIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNcrION, supra note 21, at xv, xviii.
144. See Complaint-Civil Action at <JI 1, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa.,
supra note 143.
145. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 839.
146. Gelsinger, supra note 143, at xv, xviii.
147. The FDA halted eight other gene therapy research projects at other institu
tions after discovering "a number of serious problems in the ... informed consent pro
cedures and ... a lapse in the researchers' ethical responsibilities to experimental
subjects." Grimes, 782 A.2d at 838.
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for human research participants, but at a highly prestigious research
institution in the United States. 148 As the facts in Grimes and the
situation leading to Jesse Gelsinger's death illustrate, the "scientific
and medical communities cannot ... assume sole authority to deter
mine ultimately what is right and appropriate."149

Revisiting Alexis
Alexis feels misled. She intended to help scientists and physi
cians study Huntington's disease. Instead, she was seriously and neg
atively affected by the disclosure of her PHI. Because the medical
community's reliance on the doctrine of informed consent and IRB
oversight has failed to adequately protect Alexis, she now must seek
protection through the legal system.
V.

PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS BY HOLDING MEDICAL
RESEARCHERS LIABLE

Legal remedies can compensate research participants for the
effects of the unauthorized disclosure of PHI. However, for there
to be an entitlement to a legal remedy, a duty must first exist be
tween researchers and research participants. A discussion of legal
duty is presented below. This Part also identifies those individuals
or entities that are subject to liability for failing to protect research
participants by not adequately informing them of PHI disclosure
practices and risks.
A.

Establishing a Duty Between Researchers and Participants

Before a research participant may seek a legal remedy for
harm suffered as a result of the disclosure of PHI, the participant
must first establish that the defendant-researcher owed him or her a
duty,150 Where a researcher provides medical treatment to a re
search participant, the researching physician also has a doctor-pa
tient relationship with the research participant, and therefore owes
a duty of care to the patient-subject,151 A medical researcher, even
if not a participant's treating physician, may still owe a duty of care
to the research participant as the research participant "looks to the
148.
Epoch, 25
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 839 (citing Jeffrey H. Barker, Human Experimentation of a Merciless
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 603, 617 (1999)).
Id. at 817.
Noah, supra note 2, at 208.
/d.
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investigator as an expert and places his trust in the investigator's
expertise."152
The court in Grimes held that research normally creates "spe
cial relationships" resulting in duties, the breaches of which may
ultimately result in liability.1 53 Other paths to establishing a legal
duty between a researcher and research participant exist. For in
stance, a duty can arise by virtue of a relationship, by contract, or
directly from a statute, regulation, or rule. 154
1.

Nature of Research Relationships

According to Grimes, there is no bright-line rule that estab
lishes when a special relationship exists between a researcher and
participant.1 55 Instead, the court used a fact-driven analysis to hold
that "such research agreements can, as a matter of law, constitute
'special relationships' ... [and] ... that, normally, such special rela
tionships are created between researchers and the human subjects
used by the researchers. "156 The Grimes court stated that "the very
nature of ... scientific research on human subjects can, and nor
mally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise."157
The court justified its holding: "[W]e know of no law, nor have we
been directed to any applicable [law] ... that provides that the par
ties to a scientific study ... cannot be held to have entered into
special relationships with the subjects of the study."158
2.

Contractual Relationships

A duty can also arise by contract. The Grimes court held that
informed consent agreements can constitute contracts. 159 The court
explained that by having a research participant sign a consent form,
both the researcher and research participant expressly make repre
sentations, creating a bilateral contract. 160 The Grimes court found
that a consent agreement suggests that a research participant agrees
to participate in the research study, expecting that she will be "in
formed of all the information necessary for [her] to freely choose
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Grimes, 782 A.2d at 819.
Id. at 842 (citing Bobo v. State, 697 A.2d 1371, 1375-76 (Md. 1997)).
See id.
[d. at 858 (emphasis added).
Id. at 834-35.
Id. at 834.
[d. at 844.
Id. at 843.
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whether to participate ... and [will] receive promptly any informa
tion that might bear on [her] willingness to continue to participate
in the study."161 Information regarding the risk of mishandled PHI
may directly influence an individual's choice to participate in a re
search study.
3.

Statutes and Regulations

A duty can also arise from the requirement to comply with
statutes or regulations. 162 For example, federal regulations guiding
federally funded research impose standards of care in medical re
search. 163 The HHS and FDA regulations require adherence to
"sound ethical principles,"164 including informing patients of "all
risks that are reasonably foreseeable" or those that are well
known. 165 Although the federal regulations do not create a private
right of action, the regulations recognize the existence of a common
law duty to inform research participants. 166
Federal regulations further contemplate that a research partici
pant will retain certain legal remedies. For example, researchers
are prohibited from including language in the informed consent
that would waive legal rights or "release the investigator, the spon
sor, the institution or its agents [i.e., business associates] from liabil
ity."167 Therefore, by not disclosing risks, such as actual PHI
disclosure practices that would reasonably affect an individual's de
cision to participate in research, those responsible for research stud
ies could violate the very regulations that presume that, in addition
to the research investigator, "the [research] institution or its IRB
could be liable in negligence for injury to a research subject."168
Failure to comply with the provisions contained within
HIPAA's Privacy Rule also creates a basis for establishing a special
relationship or duty, akin to the relationships and duties defined by
the HHS and FDA regulations. HIPAA requires health care enti
ties to comply with the standards set forth by HHS "to protect the
161.
162.
163.
subjects);
164.
165.
1340 (4th
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 846.
Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2005) (HHS protections for human research
21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2005) (FDA protections for human research subjects).

Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848.
Id. (citing Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471, affd, 829 F.2d
Cir. 1987)).
Noah, supra note 2, at 216 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.20.
Noah, supra note 2, at 216.
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security, confidentiality, and integrity of health information."169
Failure to adequately protect PHI, or to adequately supervise busi
ness associates with respect to handing PHI, breaches a duty owed
to research participants, exposing researchers to liability. There
fore, HIPAA's Privacy Rule, as it relates to protecting PHI in medi
cal research, establishes a special relationship between researchers
and participants. 17o As a result, researchers have a duty to ade
quately protect PHI and inform research participants of the risks of
PHI disclosure associated with participation in the clinical trial.
The breach of these duties should result in liability.
B.

Failure to Inform Research Participants of PHI Disclosure
Risks Exposes Multiple Parties to Liability

Mishandling PHI in the medical research environment impli
cates mUltiple parties. Liability extends beyond those directly re
sponsible for disclosing PHI to unauthorized recipients. In fact,
causes of action for negligence can be pursued against those gener
ally responsible for medical research: IRBs, individual IRB mem
bers, hospitals, business associates, research sponsors, and treating
physicians. l71
1.

IRBs

Although tort lawsuits against IRBs are relatively rare, they
have begun to increase.1 72 Research participants commonly en
counter judgment-proof173 researchers and must look "higher up
the chain of research oversight for a more promising defendant."174
Given that IRBs, by regulation, may require additional disclosures
from researchers that will meaningfully add to the protections of
research participants, it follows that IRBs may be held liable for
failing to request additional disclosures and for failing to investigate
and warn participants of current research practices with respect to
169. Williams, supra note 66, at 373.
170. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164.
171. See infra Part V.c. (using a claim of negligence to provide a remedy for
Alexis).
172. Noah, supra note 2, at 207.
173. A debtor is judgment-proof if he or she is "unable to satisfy a judgment for
money damages because the person ... does not own enough property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 861 (8th ed. 2004).
174. Noah, supra note 2, at 209. Institutions having IRBs normally have signifi
cant financial resources derived from financial rewards related to research, whether
received in the form of grants or similar compensation for housing a clinical trial within
the walls of the institution. Id. at 210.
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handling PHI.175 Requiring additional efforts and disclosures to in
form participants, or protect them from the risks of unauthorized
disclosure of PHI, is an IRB duty.17 6
Holding an IRB responsible is sound because research partici
pants are also considered third-party beneficiaries 177 to research
agreements and contracts, between the hospital, the IRB, and the
researcher.178 Such agreements elevate research participants to
third-party beneficiary status because participants are, by design,
intended to benefit from the IRB's protection.17 9 To be sure, re
search participants reasonably rely on the IRB for protection from
the risks inherent in research in exchange for their participation. 180
IRBs may argue, in defense, that they cannot effectively supervise
clinical research or the risks associated with participation in re
search due to inadequate staffing or institutional support, financial
or otherwise. However, such an explanation as to this factual find
ing is likely to "fail to persuade a jury."181
2.

IRB members

Individual IRB members do not enjoy the same immunity for
their participation on the IRB as those individuals who serve on
institutional peer review boards and receive legal immunity in ex
change for candid evaluations of hospital physicians. 182 In fact, the
Grimes court explained that it was "not aware of any general legal
precept that immunizes ... 'institutional volunteers' or scientific
researchers from the responsibility for the breaches of duties arising
in 'special relationships.' "183 Therefore, individual members of an
175. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b) (2005); 21 CF.R. § 56.109(b) (2006).
176. 45 CF.R. § 46.109(b); 21 CF.R. § 56.109(b).
177. A third-party beneficiary is "[a] person who, though not a party to a con
tract, stands to benefit from the contract's performance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 173, at 165.
178. Noah, supra note 2, at 209.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 210.
181. Id. at 219.
182. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 411
12, 100 Stat. 3784, 3784-86 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 11111-12 (2000)) (immunity from
and standards for professional review); see also William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a
Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequately Protected by State Medical Licen
sure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L.
329, 344-49 (2005) (discussing legal immunity in peer review and credentialing in
hospitals).
183. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 834 (Md. 2001).
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IRB are subject to liability for failing to protect research partici
pants by not informing them of the risks of mishandled PHI.
3.

Hospitals

Patients who are treated and injured in a hospital can bring
claims against a hospital when peer review credentialing commit
tees 184 hire or retain a negligent physician. 185 By analogy, research
participants should also be in a position to recover from a hospital
when its IRB fails to properly review, approve, or monitor human
subject research within its facility by failing to provide participants
with all material information. Vicarious liability also extends to
hospitals for the actions of its employees or business associates per
forming tasks requiring disclosure of PHJ.186 Healthcare institu
tions that choose to utilize business associates would "become
[liable] ... if another entity, such as a billing agent ... transmits
health information on their behalf."187
4.

Business Associates

Business associates disclosing PHI, either intentionally or unin
tentionally, should also expect to face direct liability for injuries
sustained from mishandled PHI, as business associates have con
tracted to protect participants' health information.1 88 If the disclo
sure of PHI results from an intentional act of an employee, a
business associate may argue that the employee acted beyond the
scope of employment.1 89 That argument would certainly be at
184. Peer review credentialing is a hospital's internal process of admitting and
retaining physicians by forming a committee of colleagues to provide candid evalua
tions of physicians. See Grande v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that peer review committees "promote uninhibited investi
gation and expression of opinion" because their members enjoy immunity from legal
liability); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (2003) (stating "the proceedings,
reports and records of a medical peer review committee shall be confidential").
185. Noah, supra note 2, at 211.
186. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b )(1) (2005) ("A covered entity must train all members
of its workforce on the policies and procedures with respect to protected health infor
mation ....").
187. Williams, supra note 66, at 382.
188. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1) (explaining that a covered entity may release PHI
to a business associate only if the "covered entity obtains satisfactory assurance that the
business associate will appropriately safeguard the information"); 45 c.F.R.
§ 164.504(e)(2)(ii)(D) (requiring that any agents of the business associate agree to the
same conditions to protect PHI).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958) (stating a "master is
not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment").
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tempted in cases where a particular employee has acted on his own
accord and not within the policies or procedures of the business.
However, a more persuasive argument is that the employer is ulti
mately responsible because the employer failed to adequately su
pervise the employee. For example, failing to monitor external e
mail communications containing PHI may constitute a negligent act
on behalf of a business associate. 190
5.

Research Sponsors

Research sponsors, like the fictitious GenoPharm, may be held
liable for failing to adequately inform research participants of the
true risks inherent in current research practices. Since sponsors of
multi-center research often take the responsibility of drafting the
information and materials provided to research participants, it fol
lows that research sponsors should be held liable for deficiencies in
authorizations and informed consent agreements. 191 Furthermore,
research sponsors directly benefit from research subjects' participa
tion. It is unfair, therefore, to allow research sponsors to avoid lia
bility for failing to disclose material risks when sponsors are in a
position to control the content of uniform authorizations. 192
6.

Physicians

In cases where a researcher is also a treating physician, and a
conflict of interest might alter his or her professional judgment, the
physician-researcher has the highest level of fiduciary duty to the
190. See id. § 219(2)(b) (stating that an employer can be held liable for inten
tional torts of an employee acting outside the scope of employment if the employer is
also negligent or reckless). In this case, the employer could have properly supervised or
controlled e-mail transmissions of employees, especially those that contain PHI and
those that appear to be transmitted to multiple recipients.
191. Kubiak, supra note 16, at 788.
192. However, since hospitals have differing methods for handling PHI in the
healthcare setting, a research sponsor can argue that it lacks specific knowledge of ac
tual disclosure practices and is not in a position to warn participants of associated risks.
Nevertheless, a research sponsor who develops materials for participants must be re
quired to disclose risks associated with common activities, such as exporting billing,
data analysis, and medical monitoring operations. See McLean, supra note 65, at 215.
In addition, there is an inherent conflict of interest in these situations, and therefore
patients may be in even greater danger of remaining uninformed. For example, Ge
noPharm's goal is for patients to agree to participate in medical research so that it may
receive FDA approval of its products. At the same time, if GenoPharm had made a full
disclosure to Alexis of how her PHI would be traveling the globe, Alexis would likely
not have participated in the research trial, especially since she was not receiving any
personal or therapeutic benefit.
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patient-subject.1 93 Conflicts of interest are common to the medical
research community,194 especially where a researcher has "per
sonal, financial, or political interests that undermine his or her abil
ity to meet or fulfill his or her primary professional, ethical, or legal
obligations."195 When a physician has personal interests unrelated
to the patient's health, the physician must disclose the presence and
extent of these interests to the patient. 196 A common conflict of
interest exists where a physician acts in the dual capacity as a pri
mary care physician and a researcher, requiring the physician to
"deftly balance his recommendations."197 However, even in cases
where a medical investigator is acting solely as a researcher, a spe
cial relationship still exists. 198
C.

Using a Negligence Claim to Provide a Remedy

The discussion below outlines a negligence cause of action
based on a failure to protect research participants by not warning
them of the common practices of PHI disclosure and the risks asso
ciated with these practices. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must
establish the following elements by a preponderance of the evi
dence: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff experienced
actual harm or a legally recognized injury, (4) that the defendant
was a cause in fact of the harm caused to plaintiff, and (5) that the
defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.199
193. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
("[A] physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment.").
194. Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, Financial Associations of Au
thors, 346 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1901, 1901-02 (2002) (explaining that the New England
Journal of Medicine will refuse publication to physicians only in the event of significant
financial interests in the manufacture of a product, versus the previous standard where
any financial conflict would have resulted in withholding of publication).
195. ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONover OF RE·
SEARCH 141 (2003).
196. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
197. Williams, supra note 19, at 69. Some research institutions have managed
similar physician-researcher conflicts by utilizing third-party monitors. Id. at 73. Study
enrollers explain to patients the amount and source of funding the physician will receive
as a result of their participation in the clinical trial. Alternatively, consent monitors,
employed by the IRB, can oversee the entire consent process. Id. at 73-74.
198. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001).
199. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2001); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-282 (1965) (identifying elements for a negligence cause of
action and the standard for negligence liability).
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First, assuming a court finds that researchers and participants
enjoy a special relationship that creates a duty on behalf of the re
searchers to adequately inform participants of the risks of PHI dis
closure, the remammg elements of negligence must be
demonstrated. 20o
Second, a research participant must establish that researchers
breached their duty by failing to protect him or her as a research
participant. 20l In a negligence action, failure to comply with the
Common Rule, FDA regulations, or HIPAA will provide the neces
sary elements of duty, breach, and proximate cause, under the doc
trine of negligence per se,202 so long as the research participant is
within the class of persons protected by the statute and the injury,
or risk of injury, is of the type the statute seeks to prevent.203 Since
the Common Rule and FDA regulations aim to protect research
participants and because HIPAA was implemented to protect the
PHI of consumers, it follows that research participants fall within
the class of persons protected by each statute. 204 These statutes
also recognize the risk of compromising an individual's PHI; there
fore, the statutes establish a duty to inform participants of risks re
lated to PHI disclosure given common disclosure practices among
researchers, business associates, and sponsors. When a researcher
violates federal statutes designed to protect research participants,
liability flows from the "breach of statute rather than from demon

200. See supra Part V.A.
201. See supra Part V.A.
202. Cf Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920). "We must be on our
guard, however, against confusing the question of negligence with that of the causal
connection between the negligence and the injury." Id. at 816. "[T]he omission of a
safeguard prescribed by statute ... is held not merely some evidence of negligence, but
negligence in itself." Id. at 815. A statute or regulation designed to protect "is not to
be brushed aside as a form of words." Id. at 816; see also Price v. Blood Bank of Del.,
Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1212-13 (Del. 2002) (finding "that the violation of a statute, or
regulation having the force of statute, enacted for the safety of others is negligence in
law or negligence per se").
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001) ("An
actor is negligent [per se] if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed
to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident
victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect."); see id. § 15
(excused statutory violations are not negligence: reasonable care in an attempt to com
ply with statute, confusing statutory requirements, etc.).
204. See 45 c.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2006) (HHS Common Rule); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20
(2006) (FDA informed consent); 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-.124 (2006) (FDA institutional re
view boards).
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strative proof of how the [researcher] was at fault."205 In fact, it is
unnecessary to show that a researcher's "actions were unreasona
ble, [or] how they foreseeably exposed the plaintiff to an undue risk
of harm."206
Healthcare institutions providing support for research activities
will attempt to defend a statutory violation. 207 For example, a hos
pital may argue that its statutory violation is excused because it has
taken reasonable measures to comply with federal privacy regula
tions but that full compliance is cost-prohibitive. 208 With little case
law testing this defense, it is difficult to examine its merit given the
federal requirement to comply with the Common Rule, FDA regu
lations, and HIPAA. In any event, "[court] opinions tend to start
with a discussion of IRB negligence in failing to protect a research
subject from injuries and then work backwards to announce, or
more often simply assume, the existence of a duty of care," leaving
less room for a compliance defense. 209
Third, actual damages must be proven. 210 The damages need
not be the physical harm 211 most often encountered in informed
consent claims. 212 The harm experienced in the event of unautho
rized disclosure of PHI is comparable to the harm experienced in
tort claims of assault, damage to reputation, and libel or slander. 213
205. David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1010 (2004) (discussing negligence per se excuses available to
manufacturers in products liability contexts).
206. Id.
207. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 15.
208. See P. Greg Gulick, E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic,
Legal, Regulatory, Cultural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and
Cybermedicine Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 351, 384 (2002).
209. Noah, supra note 2, at 214.
210. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114.
211. 2 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 311 (commenting that private information pub
lished to others may be an invasion of privacy and emotionally harmful, therefore al
lowing a cause of action to seek damages resulting from purely emotional harms
unaccompanied by a physical injury). Even if claims in negligence are not successful,
remedies can be found in "rules of privacy invasion or breach of confidence." ld.; see
also id. § 460 (discussing rights in personality, or reputation, to address privacy inva
sions that result in economic damages to the plaintiff).
212. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 812-13 (Md. 2001)
(exposing healthy children to anticipated accumulation of lead in blood stream); see
also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990) (taking sam
ples of blood, serum, skin, bone marrow, and sperm from patient unaware that tissues
were used for research purposes); supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (describ
ing the death of Jesse Gelsinger, a research participant).
213. See supra note 211.
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Fourth, a research participant must demonstrate cause in fact,
or actual cause. 214 In medical research, mUltiple actors often share
responsibility for inflicting a single indivisible injury-in this case,
the effects of mishandled PHJ.215 Even though it may be difficult
for a plaintiff to apportion responsibility among several tortfeasors,
joint and severalliability216 becomes a useful tool to force defend
ants to apportion fault amongst themselves. 217 Joint and severallia
bility prevents a defendant, such as an IRB, from being excused
merely because the harm could have occurred in the absence of the
IRB's failure to warn the plaintiff of risks inherent in current re
search disclosure practices. 218 Therefore, an IRB can remain as a
defendant because the IRB can be considered either a cause in fact
or a substantial factor in the disclosure of a research participant's
PHI.2I9
Finally, proximate cause must be determined. 220 Proximate
cause focuses on whether liability should be extended because the
risk of harm was foreseeable. 221 A violation of a statute or federal
regulation, such as HHS, FDA, or HIPAA regulations, establishes
proximate cause because the statute itself explicitly identifies the
necessary foreseeable plaintiffs (research participants) and the fore
seeable risks (loss of a privacy interest in PHI).222
Generally, the foreseeability of the manner in which the injury
occurs is irrelevant, as is the extent of the injury. However, an in
tervening cause or act may terminate liability if the act itself is sig
214. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114.
215. For example, a hospital may have acted negligently in selecting a business
associate and the business associate may have been negligent or reckless in disclosing
PHI to unauthorized recipients.
216. "Joint and several liability" is defined as "[ljiability that may be apportioned
either among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group
.... [B]ut a paying party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from nonpay
ing parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 933.
217. See Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.
1952) (finding that without imposing joint liability, "the plaintiff [WOUld be] in no better
position to produce the required proof of the portion of the injury attributable to each
of the defendants").
218. The issue is whether the release of PHI would have occurred but for the
negligent act of the individual or entity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No.2, 2002) (but-for standard for factual cause).
219. See id. § 26 cmt. j (explaining that when the but-for test fails and the release
of PHI still would have occurred, a party may still be a cause in fact of the injury if the
party is determined to be a substantial factor in causing the injury).
220. 1 DOBBS, supra note 199, § 114.
221. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928).
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2001).
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nificant. 223 Such a cause would relieve a defendant of liability
because the causal link between the defendant's negligent act and
the eventual harm would have been broken by the intervening
cause. A defendant, such as an IRB member, may attempt to es
tablish that an act of disclosing PHI by a business associate is an
intervening act that supersedes any liability. However, the risk of a
business associate negligently or recklessly disclosing PHI to an un
authorized recipient that results in a loss of career, loss of insurance
coverage, damage to reputation, and economic damage, is the very
same risk of failing to warn a research participant of common prac
tices related to the disclosure of their PHI in medical research. 224
Therefore, those involved in research should not be permitted to
place blame on the actions of a business associate in an effort to
escape liability.
Revisiting Alexis
Alexis sought to advance scientific understanding of an incur
able disease. However, she suffered damage to her reputation and
lost her career because her disease was disclosed to her employer and
members of her community as a direct result of her participation in
the clinical trial. The medical research community relied on in
formed consent, authorization, and IRB oversight to protect Alexis.
When these measures failed, Alexis was forced to pursue a legal
remedy.
In addition to possible contractual claims, Alexis should succeed
in a negligence cause of action against those involved in the clinical
trial, including the hospital, its IRB, individualIRB members, busi
ness associates, the research sponsor, and her physician, both as her
treating physician and as a medical researcher. The medical re
searchers had a duty to inform Alexis of disclosure risks. They
breached this duty by not informing Alexis of the risks material to
her as a research participant. Alexis will be successful in establishing
that those involved in the clinical trial were an actual cause of her
injury. Alexis can also establish that she was both a foreseeable
223. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 173, at 234 (stating that an interven
ing cause is "[a]n event that comes between the initial event in a sequence and the end
result, thereby altering the natural course of events that might have connected a wrong
ful act to an injury").
224. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E. 2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980)
(finding that an intervening act does not sever liability "and relieve an actor of responsi
bility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk" associated
with the defendant's negligent act).
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plaintiff and that the risks of mishandled PHI were foreseeable, mak
ing it fair to allow Alexis to recover damages.
CONCLUSION

The issue of liability condenses to one essential fact: most re
search participants are not informed of everything that they need to
know to make an informed decision to participate in a clinical trial.
Warning prospective participants of the risks associated with mod
ern practices of disclosing PHI must be a universal practice. To
properly inform participants of the true risks associated with partic
ipating in medical research, the medical research community must
disclose actual business practices common to the industry. Prospec
tive participants are the only ones who can make a truly informed
decision whether to participate in medical research after balancing
the benefits they expect to receive, if any, against the risks associ
ated with participating in medical research.
Such additional disclosures will not likely have a chilling effect
on research participation. In fact, an increase in confidence in the
medical research community may result. The medical or legal com
munities can hardly condemn being forthright with all research-re
lated risks in an effort to protect participants. If plaintiffs succeed
in obtaining judgments against medical researchers, either the costs
of medical research will increase, or the willingness of individuals to
participate in research will decrease. Either event would require
adjustments in the protections provided to research participants.
However, not permitting research participants to recover damages
resulting from unauthorized disclosure of PHI, merely because they
chose to advance scientific knowledge by participating in a clinical
trial, comes dangerously close to revisiting the distrust in medical
research that led to the very developments designed to protect
human research participants.
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